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IDEOLOGICAL ENDOWMENT: THE STAYING 
POWER OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND 
THE WEAKNESSES OF THE NATIONAL 
POPULAR VOTE INTERSTATE COMPACT 
Daniel P. Rathbun* † 
Introduction 
The National Popular Vote (“NPV”) movement is designed to eliminate 
the federalist impact of the Electoral College without amending the Consti-
tution. By fashioning an interstate compact to grant participating states’ 
electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote, NPV proponents 
suppose they can induce states to forfeit their electoral “weights” and re-
place the current, federalist election process with a fully majoritarian one. 
But by leaving the Electoral College in place, the NPV movement is setting 
itself up for a double pushback: first, in the form of immediate legal resis-
tance, and second, through states’ long-term involvement in a meaningfully 
intact federalist system.  
This Comment argues that the NPV will fail to institutionalize a majori-
tarian election process and that a constitutional amendment is necessary to 
eliminate the Electoral College’s federalist impact. Applying sociological 
theory, this Comment concludes that proponents of abolishing the Electoral 
College by constitutional amendment should aim to “dis-embed” pro-
Electoral College federalist theory by implementing a compelling majori-
tarian alternative. It explains why the NPV has not accomplished this task 
and how future efforts should proceed differently. 
I. The National Popular Vote Movement Will Fail to 
Institutionalize a Majoritarian Election Process 
The Electoral College works, in conjunction with other constitutional in-
stitutions such as the enumeration of federal powers and the bicameral 
Congress, to maintain the Framers’ anticipated balance between state and 
federal authority. Together, these institutions form a coherent federalist sys-
tem. And this system poses considerable—and likely fatal—legal and 
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practical barriers to the NPV’s efforts to institutionalize majoritarian elec-
tions.  
The most significant constitutional challenges to the NPV will likely 
arise under the Compact Clause, which forbids states from entering into 
“any Agreement or Compact with another State” without the “Consent of 
Congress.” NPV supporters highlight that this Clause is interpreted loosely, 
and that current jurisprudence, as represented by U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax 
Commission (1978), forbids only those compacts that “enhance[] state 
power quoad the National Government.” Accordingly, NPV supporters pre-
sume their anticipated compact effects a horizontal shift in power among 
states rather than affecting the vertical relationship between federal and state 
power. But this argument is patently thin. There are few subjects likely to 
upset U.S. Steel’s vertical balance more than the means by which states se-
lect a federal executive. The NPV compact would take effect once the 
combined electoral votes of the participating states could determine the 
election’s outcome. The ability of a few states to determine election out-
comes would give “the states” a unified face and an important advantage in 
bargaining with the federal government. As Adam Schleifer points out in his 
article Interstate Agreement for Electoral Reform, the NPV compact would 
also prevent the House of Representatives from acting as an Electoral Col-
lege tiebreaker in the way the Twelfth Amendment anticipates. Predictable 
state voting prevents ties and nullifies this potential federal presence, further 
disrupting the vertical balance.  
The NPV also faces a number of other significant constitutional obsta-
cles. In New York v. United States (1992), the Supreme Court instructed that 
“[a] departure from the Constitution’s plan for the intergovernmental alloca-
tion of authority cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials” 
because “the Constitution divides authority between federal and state gov-
ernments for the protection of individuals” (emphasis added). While New 
York dealt with the specific issue of anti-commandeering, the Court con-
veyed a broader concern for the preservation of federalism. This discredits 
the NPV movement’s claim that the constitutional freedom of states to allo-
cate electoral votes allows them to allocate by reference to the national 
majority alone. And the NPV compact’s form is independently objection-
able. As the Supreme Court has objected to the Line Item Veto Act and other 
circum-constitutional shortcuts, the Court would presumably take issue with 
the NPV compact, which, as The New York Times has pointed out, blatantly 
advertises itself as an “end run.” 
Yet even if the NPV overcomes the challenges to its constitutionality, it 
will fail to eliminate states’ federalist participation in presidential elections. 
The process it envisions is not truly majoritarian. Though the NPV hinges its 
arguments upon the supposed vestigiality of the Electoral College, it leaves 
the Electoral College in place, depending upon its state-centric system in a 
fundamental way to facilitate the NPV’s goals. The states’ uneven electoral 
weights make the NPV compact easier to effectuate than a constitutional 
amendment. Because of these weights, as few as eleven pro-NPV states 
could reconfigure the country’s electoral process. And highlighting this fact 
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is more than a formalistic endeavor. Allowing the states to institutionalize 
majoritarianism ignores that citizens have made a substantive choice to tem-
per their majority interests through the reigning constitutional order. It also 
denies that majoritarianism is an ideology, that a state’s choice to vote in 
line with the national majority is still a choice, and that a state’s agency in 
this choice is irremediably federalist. Also, as Schleifer highlights, the per-
ceived unfairness of an NPV-initiated majoritarian system could generate a 
pro-federalist backlash among states not party to the agreement. Since states 
currently tally their own votes, non-participating states could purposefully 
obfuscate to prevent NPV states from discerning the national tally or from 
effectuating the compact more generally.  
The uncertain duration and enforceability of the anticipated compact 
raise even greater long-term concerns. The NPV’s current popularity likely 
stems from immediate concerns about the Electoral College’s fairness and a 
perceived anti-Democratic bias. It seems telling, for example, that the 
“Amar Plan,” the root of the NPV legislation, was proposed by Professors 
Akhil Reed Amar and Vikram Amar after the 2000 election, in which Re-
publican George W. Bush defeated Democrat and national popular vote 
winner Al Gore. It is likewise revealing that Maryland and New Jersey, two 
of the country’s most Democratic states, are the only ones to have enacted 
the NPV, and that Michigan, a battleground state that gains money and at-
tention from the Electoral College system, has not introduced NPV for a 
vote. However, as time passes, states’ incentives will change. Majoritarian-
ism may not work well for all states, and some of them will desire less 
egalitarian alliances. As Stanley Chang observes in Recent Development: 
Updating the Electoral College: the National Popular Vote Legislation, 
states’ ability to legislate out of the NPV compact, after initially agreeing to 
it, would enable them to do this. As Schleifer notes, the possible unenforce-
ability of the compact might enable dissatisfied states to withdraw from the 
compact sooner rather than later. But in either case, the Electoral College’s 
continued existence is what would facilitate states’ post-NPV deal making. 
The NPV’s design as an end run around the constitutional amendment proc-
ess will seal the compact’s undoing. 
II. Electoral College Reform Must Confront the Theory of
Federalism and Present a Compelling Majoritarian Alternative 
Aside from highlighting the fact that a constitutional amendment is a 
necessary prerequisite to Electoral College reform, the NPV’s likely failure 
also conveys a broader social message. While a majority of Americans sup-
port presidential elections by popular vote, the states’ continued reliance on 
the Electoral College indicates that our society still believes in the Electoral 
College to some extent—if not at an individual level, then at an institutional 
one. This makes sense from a sociological perspective. As sociologists Mar-
garet Somers and Fred Block explain in their article From Poverty to 
Perversity, popular theories become “embedded” in the public’s conscious-
ness and have independent influence on political outcomes. The NPV’s 
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failure stems from its inability to dis-embed the federalist theory supporting 
the Electoral College. And the lessons for other would-be reformers are 
clear. 
According to Somers and Block, it is fundamentally difficult for new 
theories to dis-embed old ones. In order to successfully dis-embed the pre-
vailing theory, a new theory must contain “the means of making itself true” 
and assume a very specific form. First, a new theory must demonstrate why 
the prevailing theory aggravates society’s problems. Second, the new theory 
must explain how intelligent people could have believed the prevailing the-
ory. And finally, the new theory must present a more compelling narrative 
than the one provided by the prevailing theory.  
Using this framework, it is easy to understand how the prevailing feder-
alist theory became embedded and why the NPV movement has failed to 
dis-embed it. The Framers conceived of our current system in response to a 
national crisis and incorporated that system into a coherent narrative about 
American identity. A federalist government was created to avoid the disarray 
of the Articles of Confederation and the tyranny of the Crown. Moreover, as 
The Federalist, the debates surrounding the Constitutional Convention, and 
other vehicles of national debate made clear, the new government reflected 
our identity as a people.  
The NPV also conceives of itself in the context of a national crisis. As 
the compact’s proponents point out, the Electoral College’s recently high-
lighted potential to deviate from majority opinion threatens the perceived 
fairness and legitimacy of our electoral framework. Yet supporters of the 
NPV downplay the novelty of their proposal. The compact does not suggest 
that people are mistaken when they believe the prevailing theory of federal-
ism behind the Electoral College. Nor does the compact present a new 
narrative. Instead, by leaving the Electoral College intact and proceeding on 
a state-by-state basis rather than adopting a national solution through a con-
stitutional amendment, the NPV would inhabit the current system. It would 
bootstrap upon the existing federalist narrative rather than providing a new 
(and more compelling) majoritarian one.  
In arguing that the interstate compact is constitutional, NPV supporters 
imply that it is consistent with federalism for states to allocate electoral 
votes based on national returns. But this argument is both disingenuous and 
counterproductive. It is disingenuous because the NPV begins with a not-so-
secret presumption that federalist elections are unfair. It is counterproductive 
because, as Part I demonstrates, the NPV compact would only last as long as 
the participating states found it expedient. The NPV might provide a tempo-
rarily compelling version of the existing federalist narrative, but it cannot 
take root without reconceptualizing our electoral narrative along majori-
tarian lines. The states may reject the NPV model at any time, and the NPV 
never clearly says that they should refrain from doing so.  
Despite the NPV’s inadequacies, however, there is reason to think that a 
properly constituted majoritarian narrative could meet Somers and Block’s 
criteria and dis-embed the prevailing federalist theory. Unlike the NPV, an 
amendment-oriented initiative would send a clear signal that fundamental 
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change is sought; it would also emphasize that majoritarian elections are not 
only “fair” and “who we are” but also “who we are now.” This is the appro-
priate tenor for reform, and there are plenty of notes to fill in the score.  
When the Framers designed our current system, the states played a sali-
ent role in citizens’ lives. But that role has since diminished in relevant 
ways. The widespread use of elector pledges and winner-take-all voting in-
dicates that citizens are now suspicious of state discretion in the context of 
presidential elections. Advancements in transportation and communications 
technology, meanwhile, signal that personal allegiances are increasingly 
based upon interstate ideological ties. This diminishing state affiliation sug-
gests that the Electoral College works to promote arbitrary battlegrounds 
rather than to protect identity or to combat faction. Since the framing, states 
have also lost a great deal of power vis-à-vis the federal government. The 
Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments reflect contemporary understand-
ings that states are potentially as tyrannical as the federal government and 
that majoritarianism is preferable to federalism in some electoral contexts. 
The trend toward majoritarianism is even more pronounced in areas pertain-
ing to the scope and execution of federal law; the President’s increased 
involvement in administrative decision making and the expansion of Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence, for example, reflect the perceived 
impracticality of interest group representation and decentralized decision 
making in our increasingly complex society.  
Placed in context, these developments toward greater federal power and 
majoritarianism fill in Somers and Block’s criteria. Federalism made sense 
at the time of the framing and still makes sense in deliberative (mostly legis-
lative) contexts today. Yet, for ideological and practical reasons, our nation 
has since veered toward majoritarianism in areas under Executive purview—
the areas with which Electoral College reform is most concerned. As time 
goes on, the prevailing federalist theory will aggravate society’s problems 
by increasing the probability of recounts and contentious electoral-popular 
splits, preventing candidates from focusing on national issues, and decreas-
ing the legitimacy of government. And this is a message that individuals and 
institutions should both be able to understand. 
Conclusion 
As a creative, unorthodox attempt at Electoral College reform, the NPV 
deserves the attention it has garnered. But, as this Comment demonstrates, 
the NPV fails on both legal and sociological grounds. From a legal perspec-
tive, the NPV overlooks significant constitutional and practical-institutional 
obstacles. From a sociological perspective, the NPV is structurally incapable 
of dis-embedding the federalist theory underlying the Electoral College. 
This Comment suggests that a properly-constituted Electoral College reform 
effort could succeed where the NPV falls short. Yet, as Somers and Block 
point out, “all ideas are not created equal.” Reform is more complex than the 
game-theory dilemma the NPV portrays it as, and it must be framed by a 
compelling story with which the public can identify. Acknowledging how 
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deeply embedded the current federalist system is by returning to the amend-
ment process would be a good way to start.  
